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ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the direct effect of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets by
using data from Indian family-controlled publicly listed firms as its sample. In particular, we study (1) the direct effects of
family ownership on innovation and (2) the influences of business group affiliation on these family firms.
Research Findings/Insights: Using an unbalanced panel of 395 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed Indian firms during the
years 2001 and 2008, we found that the impact of family ownership on innovation productivity is positive (after controlling
for possible endogeneity). We further emphasized the business group affiliation of family firms and distinguished between
the innovation activities of group-affiliated and stand-alone family firms. We found that affiliating with top 50 business
groups increases the innovation activities of these family firms.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Theoretically, we complement agency theory by incorporating both the institutional
perspective and the external resourcing perspective to provide a more robust framework for examining the impact of family
ownership on innovation in emerging markets. Methodologically, we adopted a more rigorous econometrics method by
providing a panel analysis that used a system GMM estimator and addressed the endogeneity issue thoroughly, which
represented a significant improvement over the shortcomings of the methodologies found in the existing literature.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that the Indian government should provide support for affiliating
family firms with business groups while improving policies on information disclosures; it should also establish a proper
corporate governance mechanism for private and public family business. The findings further suggest that a corporate
governance code should encourage family firms to have an independent professional CEO.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Patent, Innovation Productivity, Family Firms, Indian Business Group
INTRODUCTION
T here is a substantial body of literature that examines thecharacteristics and performance of firms with respect to
innovation. However, there is scant evidence about a direct
relationship between family ownership and innovation
(Craig & Moores, 2006). This issue is more important for
emerging markets than for markets in developed economies
because globalization of emerging markets brings both
opportunities and pressure for the domestic family-owned
firms to innovate and alleviate competition for long-term
survival (Aghion, Burgess, Redding, & Zilibotti, 2005). Fur-
thermore, Choi, Park, and Hong (2012) argue that prior
agency theory literature that addresses the role of ownership
structure on innovation from the agency perspective does
not capture the relationship in emerging markets.
The literature on corporate governance has shown that the
dynamics of ownership structure can influence technological
innovation (e.g., Lee & O’Neill, 2003). Family ownership is the
dominant form of business around the world and there is
ample literature that studies family ownership issues (e.g.,
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, a salient aspect of that
literature is the absence of studies on the effects of family
ownership on firm innovation. The existing literature on this
topic is rare and inconclusive from both developing (Chen &
Hsu, 2009; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008) and developed countries
(Block, 2012; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008). In addi-
tion, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Lester (2011) observe con-
tradictory evidence of investment for innovation by family
firms. For instance, one stream of the literature shows that
family owners follow strategies of conservatism by maintain-
ing regular income and restricting investment in innovation
to avoid risk, which ensures the security of their wealth
(Claessens, Simeon, Fan, & Lang, 2002).Another stream of the
literature argues that family owners and managers sacrifice
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their personal interests to invest in innovation to make their
firm healthy and durable and to enhance stakeholders’ value
(James, 1999).
Studies on blockholders of publicly traded firms suggest
that the contribution of large shareholders to their firms
often depends on their identity in particular institutional
environments (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). In emerg-
ing markets, it is argued that weak investor protection, poor
judicial systems, inefficient intellectual property protection,
corrupt legal systems, under-developed capital markets and
other institutional weaknesses make family ownership more
concentrated, which inevitably affects firm performance
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). However, there have been only
limited studies that directly examine the impact of family
ownership on innovation, although it has been increasingly
recognized that innovation can improve firm performance
and firm value (Blundell, Griffith, & Van Reenen, 1999; Cho
& Pucik, 2005). Furthermore, the limited studies on family
ownership and innovation were undertaken either from an
external resourcing perspective (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) or
from an agency perspective (Choi, Lee, & Williams, 2011;
Morck & Yeung, 2003). There is no noteworthy study that
attempts to reconcile agency theory and institutional theory
to investigate the impact of family ownership on firm value
(Liu, Yang, & Zhang, 2012; Peng & Jiang, 2010), which opens
an avenue to explore this important yet undeveloped issue.
This issue is relevant and important to emerging markets
because these markets have underdeveloped institutions (or
no institutions); this hinders the functionality of markets,
such as in India, in which large family business groups are
some of the most important drivers of innovation and are
responsible for large parts of the country’s economic growth
(Chakrabarti, Megginson, & Yadav, 2008; Piramal, 1996).
Based on these gaps in the literature, this study aims to
complement the agency theory by incorporating both an
institutional perspective and an external resourcing perspec-
tive to provide a better framework for examining the impact
of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets, by
using Indian family-controlled publicly listed firms as its
sample. In particular, we study (1) the direct effect of family
ownership on innovation and (2) the influence of business
group affiliation of these family firms on innovation. In this
study, our focus is on publicly traded family-controlled busi-
nesses, in which non-family individuals or institutions hold
some of the equity. Therefore, we use a unique data set of 395
Indian firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange between
the years 2001 and 2008 as our sample.
Methodologically, we adopt a panel data set of patenting
information on these firms around the world that no existing
literature in this field has analyzed. This data set reveals
intra-firm variations in innovation. Controlling for time-
varying decisions of the firms to remain family owned and
for other sources of endogeneity, we apply a well-developed
system-GMM estimator. After addressing reverse causality
between family ownership and innovation, our results show
that Indian family ownership increases innovation output
and improves firms’ innovation capacity. We also find that
affiliating with top business groups contributes significantly
to improving firms’ innovation.
We focus our study on Indian firms because India typifies
emerging markets that feature institutional underdevelop-
ment (absence of or underdeveloped institutions that
prevent the functioning of intermediate markets) and is a
good example of a market with dominant family ownership.
Approximately 70 percent of the Indian firms are family-
controlled and they are the driving forces of innovation in
India because of the absence of other types of concentrated
ownership, such as state-owned firms (Chakrabarti et al.,
2008; Piramal, 1996). These family firms usually engage with
the government opportunistically; thus they are not always
closely associated with politicians (such as Chaebol in South
Korea). Indian family firms are free from rigging markets
(such as in Mexico and Israel) and are also under market
pressure imposed by new entrant competition. These fea-
tures make Indian family firms unique and distinguish them
from comparable firms in other emerging markets.
Moreover, Indian family firms have another distinct
feature. Most are affiliated with large business groups for
external resourcing (for further discussion, see Khanna &
Palepu, 2000b:870). A number of studies have recognized
that business groups in emerging economies can mitigate
the distortion of the labor and capital markets and that
group-affiliated firms can share a group-wide reputation
that might offer access to external credit (Claessens et al.,
2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). Because the groups create
their virtual (internal) capital markets (Manos, Murinde, &
Green, 2007), the group-affiliated family firms can pool and
re-allocate funds in accordance with investment opportuni-
ties (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002). These features
of business groups in India make group-affiliated family
firms an important business arrangement to compensate for
institutional underdevelopment (also used as institutional
voids in many studies) and an inefficient capital market.
Therefore, we argue that the affiliation of Indian family firms
with business groups can positively influence the relation-
ship between family ownership and innovation, which
makes the impact of family ownership on innovation even
more unique in India compared to developed and other
developing economies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the literature review and our hypoth-
eses. We then introduce the dataset and describe the variable
design and econometric models. This is followed by an expla-
nation of the empirical results, including robustness tests. The
final section concludes the study with implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Family Ownership and Innovation
Innovation is the process of developing new technological
knowledge and putting that knowledge to productive use.
Cohen and Klepper (1996) differentiate innovation as
process and product innovation – process innovation reduces
production costs and product innovation increases the price
that consumers are willing to pay. Both types of innovation
are associated with the following risk factors: (1) The prob-
ability of the failure of R&D investment is higher than that of
conventional investments; (2) new technologies tend to be
opaque (Rajan & Zingales, 2001), which means that innova-
tion is often less understood by market participants; and (3)
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the expected return on new technology depends on the
firm’s lead-time advantage, which means that the possibility
of imitation by competitors may decrease the profitability of
successful innovation projects (Helpman, 1993). Therefore,
successful innovation requires sufficient innovation invest-
ment (such as R&D, marketing, programs to educate con-
sumers about new technologies and products), and
investment in external resourcing (such as attracting and
retaining entrepreneurs and talented scientists). Therefore,
well-developed financial systems are desirable for innova-
tion (Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005).
The ownership structure of a firm is an important deter-
minant of its innovation activities (Lee & O’Neill, 2003)
because ownership concentration may efficiently resolve
agency problems or at least so it has been argued (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Large shareholders that care about the stabil-
ity of the firm focus on long-term investment in new tech-
nology development even though it may mean temporary
fluctuations in stock prices (Choi et al., 2012).
Family control is the dominant form of business around
the world, but particularly in emerging markets; it is
typically unchallenged by other equity holders (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). In many instances,
family-owned businesses take the form of a small family
business, whereas it is a large business employing hun-
dreds, or even thousands of staff in other cases. For instance,
studies document that one-third of the S&P 500 (Anderson
& Reeb, 2003) and Fortune 500 (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986)
firms are family firms. In emerging markets, the large
family-controlled business structure is far more common
(Manikutty, 2000), and this has particularly significant effect
on innovation because these large family firms possess the
advantages in R&D investment and economies of scale that
are required for successful innovation. India is a good
example of this type of emerging market because approxi-
mately 70 percent of Indian firms are family-controlled and
large family-controlled business is a driving force of innova-
tion in India because of the absence of any other type of
concentrated ownership (e.g., Piramal, 1996).
The Extant Literature on Family Ownership
and Innovation
In family-controlled businesses, it has been argued that the
most severe agency problems result from the conflict of
interest between majority and minority shareholders (La
Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, the influence of family owner-
ship on firm innovation originates from how well the two
parties work together to reduce the agency problem and
optimize resource allocation (Belloc, 2012). On the one hand,
the advantage of family-controlled business is that concen-
trated family ownership means a high level of family
involvement in the firm, particularly when the founders of
the family serve as CEO or are on the board of directors.
They have a strong attachment to and interest in their firms.
Therefore, the incentive alignment argument is overwhelm-
ing and it reduces the agency problem between family
(majority shareholder) and other equity holders of the firm
(minority shareholders). More recently, there have been
studies that extend agency theory to explain the impact of
family ownership and innovation by incorporating steward-
ship theory. These studies show that the family normally
holds its stakes for a long time and targets greater benefits,
such as the firm’s growth, technological innovation and
long-term firm survival (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Le
Breton-Miller et al., 2011). Moreover, family ownership
tends to invest in R&D and technological innovation rather
than opting for the traditional approach of sales maximiza-
tion for short-term profitability. Therefore, family ownership
should have a positive effect on a firm’s innovation activities.
On the other hand, however, it has also been argued that
family owners tend to expropriate corporate wealth because
they hold a significantly great percentage of the outstanding
stock and usually dominate the board of directors (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). When this
behavior arises, it creates a significant agency problem
between majority and minority shareholders. When insider
family owners expropriate outside investors by diverting
corporate resources for their personal interests, it is difficult
to raise financing for technological projects and to allocate
capital to invest in innovation (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung,
2005). Therefore, the impact of family ownership on innova-
tion might be negative.
Thus far, there are only limited empirical studies to test
the above theoretical arguments, and they have focused
mostly on R&D activities in family-controlled business,
leaving the direct examination of the role of family owner-
ship on innovation unexamined. Moreover, because the
empirical evidence comes from both developed and emerg-
ing markets, the results are inconclusive.
Studies in developed economies note that founding fami-
lies – because they are aware of the learning curve of their
firms – generally have insider knowledge of R&D activities
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003), which enhances innovation capa-
bilities. In addition, by holding large equity ownership por-
tions of these firms, founding families tend to want to invest
more in R&D (Block, 2012). However, using survey data
collected by Banque de France, Sirmon et al. (2008) show
that French family firms maintain higher investment in R&D
than non-family firms, which leads to higher innovation per-
formance, but the innovation performance decreases as the
level of ownership held by families increases.
In Korea, another emerging market, Kim et al. (2008) show
that family members are more willing to invest in long-term
projects, such as R&D, for their firms than other sharehold-
ers. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2011)
study 19,000 firms across 47 developing countries and find
that controlling families improve a firm’s innovation activi-
ties. However, investigating data from Taiwanese family
firms, Chen and Hsu (2009) argue that family members may
abuse their power and misuse the funds, which leads to
decreasing R&D intensity.
Gaps in the Literature
The prior literature on agency theory indicates that agency
theory – even when reconciled with stewardship theory –
cannot provide a convincing explanation for the role of
family ownership on innovation, because the agency frame-
work has yet to fully address the influence of the institu-
tional settings of emerging markets. La Porta et al. (1999)
argue that the agency problem between majority and minor-
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ity shareholders and the effectiveness of the agency frame-
work to reduce the agency problem is largely influenced by
the institutional environment, such as poor protection of
minority shareholders. In addition, in emerging markets,
the use of pyramidal groups to separate the cash flow rights
from the voting rights of majority family owners leads to the
entrenchment of the dominant family. One of the dominating
mechanisms of this type of expropriation of minority share-
holders in emerging markets is transferring (tunneling) a
significant proportion of wealth by the family owners from
firms in which they have large control rights to firms in
which they have both large cash flow and control rights
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000;
Morck & Yeung, 2003). This tunneling of assets in the pyra-
midal structures of family firms leads to gain by the family at
the expense of other stakeholders. Recent studies have docu-
mented such problems in family business groups in Western
European and East Asian markets (Claessens et al., 2000;
Faccio & Lang, 2002). Because of persistent tunneling, the
agency conflict may decrease revenues and affect the inno-
vation activities of family firms. However, the literature has
not fully addressed the complex relationship between family
ownership and its influence on innovation, particularly in
emerging economies. Therefore, the first gap we have iden-
tified in the existing literature is that there is a lack of evi-
dence to help reconcile certain conflicting results from
agency theory and the institutional perspective to explain
the role of family ownership on innovation.
The second gap we have identified in the literature is that
there are limited empirical studies that have examined family
ownership and innovation from an external resourcing per-
spective in emerging markets. With respect to the external
resourcing perspective, this issue is particularly important in
India because a large number of Indian family firms are
affiliated with business groups that are the primary channel
of providing and accessing resources (Piramal, 1996). As we
mentioned earlier, innovation activities significantly depend
on external resourcing (technology transfers, attracting and
retaining talented scientists, foreign direct investment, etc.),
which is also influenced by the institutional framework of
any specific country. Therefore, this raises the question of
how Indian family firms can enhance innovation through
external resourcing with weak institutions.
Hypothesis Development
The type (and degree) of agency problems in listed firms is
largely affected by ownership structure and institutional
environment (La Porta et al., 2000). We will investigate how
the ownership structure of listed family business shapes
agency problems and how the relationship between family
ownership and innovation may be affected by variation in
the institutional framework.
The literature argues that, in developed economies such as
the United States or the United Kingdom, better legal pro-
tection for shareholders (particularly for minority and
outside shareholders) encourages founding families and the
family members to dilute their equity (Peng & Jiang, 2010).
The concentration of ownership in listed family business is
much less in developed countries than in emerging markets
(Khanna & Palepu, 2005). The ownership structure of listed
family firms in developed markets is dispersed compared to
that in emerging markets; thus, in developed markets, the
agency problem between majority and minority sharehold-
ers is not of major concern (La Porta et al., 2000), and the
dominant agency problem is conflicts of interests between
owners and managers (Morck & Yeung, 2003).
A special feature of family business in India is that large
firms belong to family business groups in affiliation with
business groups (Chakrabarti et al., 2008). In business
groups, the family firms control other firms; following a
pyramid structure, each firm again controls many other
firms (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Although public shareholders
provide capital at different stages of the pyramid structure,
they do not become the majority shareholder in any family
firm affiliated with the group, and their role in providing
capital and corporate governance related activities is insig-
nificant (Morck & Yeung, 2003).
In addition to this pyramid ownership structure and
similar to other emerging economies, India is also character-
ized by the absence of sufficient judicial and regulatory
institutions, which leads to a variety of market failures that
are characterized by inadequate disclosure, weak corporate
governance and weak securities regulation. The combination
of an undeveloped institutional framework and inefficient
capital markets encourages concentrated family ownership;
thus, founding families hold a majority of equity ownership
of their firms to maintain sufficient control (e.g., Khanna &
Palepu, 2000b). A larger proportion of ownership in the
hands of few owners, such as founding families, motivates
them to monitor managerial decisions, to minimize mana-
gerial agency costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and to take
measures to protect their firms’ interests. Burkart, Panunzi,
and Shleifer (2003) argue that the less that outside investors
are protected legally, the greater the need for large family
shareholders that can minimize the agency problem
between owners and managers in an emerging market.
Moreover, managers in publicly traded family firms tend to
develop a reputation for not expropriating minority share-
holders and, consequently, minority shareholders support
the family owners because the family owners control the
managers in emerging markets (Gomes, 2000). Therefore, it
is expected that managers in family firms are more likely to
be aligned with the founder family so that the conflict of
interest between minority shareholders and family owners
in India is more likely minimized.
In addition, the large shareholders of the firm can influ-
ence the allocation of scarce resources for competitive and
challenging investments such as in innovation and monitor
how the investments are being utilized (Hoskisson, Hitt,
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Because of the institutional
underdevelopment in the markets in India, the high level of
interaction, common understanding, and natural alignment
of interests between family members and employees enables
the family owners to integrate any individual specialized
technological knowledge either family members or employ-
ees may have (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). These firms are
strongly embedded in the society (Fuller & Tian, 2006) and
are often recognized as successful entrepreneurs who can
communicate their new ideas more effectively with their
governments. These owners can obtain social and political
capital, secure the supply of raw materials, financing and
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government contracts (Singh & Gaur, 2009); all of which
enhance technological innovation. Their economics of scale
and technological competence are far superior to other types
of firms (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). They also have strong
social and cultural influences in the society and maintain
good links with government agencies and can thus protect
their innovation technologies (patents) and products (Singh
& Gaur, 2009). It is plausible that concentrated Indian family
firms may focus more on utilizing resources in innovation to
enhance firm performance than on expropriating minority
shareholders.
In summary, although the same types of agency problems
in firms of developed markets afflict family firms in emerg-
ing markets such as India (e.g., the agency problem between
majority and minority shareholders, between owners and
managers, or between two family firms affiliated within the
same business group), we argue that the degree of such
agency problems, particularly between majority and minor-
ity shareholders, are less severe. The benefits of concen-
trated family ownership that help overcome institutional
underdevelopment and facilitate in obtaining external
resources outweigh these agency costs, and these benefits
are essential for technological innovation. Whereas agency
theory drives the internal corporate governance mechanism,
external mechanisms, such as institutional development,
complement the impact of family ownership on innovation
in emerging markets and promote the evolution of dynamic
capabilities for innovation in family firms. We thus propose
our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Family ownership in India has a positive impact
on the innovation activities of family firms.
Affiliating with business groups of Indian listed family busi-
nesses enables certain institutional underdevelopment to be
filled and controls certain agency problems in firms; busi-
ness groups are able to perform intermediating functions
and mitigate resource diversification costs.
Strong intermediary institutions provide the necessary
financing, technology and management talent for innovation
in developed markets (Munoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno,
2011). However, these facilitating intermediary institutions
are absent in emerging markets, such as India, because of
institutional underdevelopment, which motivates the Indian
business group to support its innovation activities. Unlike
developed markets, in the emerging markets, large business
groups act as intermediary institutions between family firms
and the imperfect market (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). In other
words, these business groups, although they are structurally
different from US conglomerates or Japanese keiretsu
(owned by large banks), often replicate the function of
stand-alone intermediary institutions in developed markets.
The group-affiliated Indian family firms can obtain access to
“internal capital markets” for funds and utilize group repu-
tation for other essential external resources for innovation
activities (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Khanna and Palepu
(2000b) empirically show that affiliation with large Indian
business groups increases firm performance by overcoming
external institutional underdevelopment in the Indian
market.
As a result, these business groups can also mitigate the
cost of their diversification because they restrict the use of
the internal capital markets to prop up inefficient operations,
and transaction costs during business operations are mini-
mized. In his seminal study on the role of the business group
to mitigate capital market distortion, Leff (1976) argues that
the group structure provides a mechanism to mobilize
managerial talents and technological knowledge, in addition
to helping affiliated firms to access internal capital markets,
which addresses the need for efficient external capital
markets (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Family ties within
business groups can also provide unconditional trust and an
organizational culture of altruism and stability, which
combine to reduce transaction costs that result from infor-
mation asymmetry and disputes. The success of innovation
is often uncertain and invites risks that require trust and
understanding among family members and employees.
Intense interactions among group affiliates help to achieve
trust and confidence and to increase the likelihood of
sharing risks (Zahra, 2003). Therefore, affiliation with large
business groups can help family firms perform more effec-
tively in the presence of institutional underdevelopment
and resolve certain information and transaction costs in
emerging markets (Chu, 2004). Khanna and Palepu (2000b)
show that the largest and the most diversified business
groups in India perform well; in addition, they share their
reputations and political connections among themselves.
Thus we develop our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Business group affiliation positively influences
the relationship between family ownership and innovation,
such that family firms affiliated with business groups are more
innovative than stand-alone family firms in India.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Data Source
Our data sources include (1) the PROWESS1 database that is
maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian
Economy (CMIE) and (2) the PATSTAT database available
through the European Patent Office. We collected ownership
data from PROWESS during 2001 and 2008 and considered
ownership being held by the ultimate owner listed on the
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). These firms are required to
follow norms set by the Securities and Exchange Board
of India (SEBI), India’s securities market regulators, in
announcing financial accounts.
Sample Construction
We eliminated observations in which the reported data were
not annual. In addition, we also dropped observations that
had more than 50 percent foreign ownership. Further, fol-
lowing Chari and David (2011), we eliminated observations
that showed an unusually high (above 50 percent) or low
(below 50 percent) return on assets, as this information
might consist of large asset selloffs or purchases.
We excluded financial institutions from our study. Finan-
cial institutions are generally professional investors with
significant experience with historical returns. Thus, they act
differently from individual shareholders. Naturally, institu-
tional investors choose to invest in companies with higher
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productivity potentials. In addition, because Indian banks
do not belong to business groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b)
and because we are investigating the effects of business
groups on the innovation of family firms, we also excluded
banks.
Because we required firms to have active R&D (i.e., firms
that have filed at least one patent application), we extracted
all patent information related to Indian firms from PATSTAT
and found that these firms filed approximately 10,000
patents in various patent offices around the world. Because
our focus is to track the innovation activities of family firms,
we considered the patent filing year (first filing) as the refer-
ence year for our dataset. Because PATSTAT has the raw data
for all patents filed in more than 80 countries around the
world, the hard task is to find a common identifier to
match this patent data with ownership data obtained from
PROWESS. We cleaned the names of Indian firms (also with
help from Magerman, Grouwels, Song, and van Looy, 2009)
and took these firm names (strings) to match with firm
names obtained from PROWESS. We used the Levenshtein
distance algorithm (sometimes called edit distance) for
coding and grouping firm names. This provided us with a
sample of 428 matched firms that had active patents
recorded in PATSTAT. Because the ownership data available
from 2001 to 2008 are from the PROWESS database (2008
version), after matching the two data sets and excluding
state-owned firms (in which the government holds more
than 50 percent of a firm’s shares) and addressing missing
data and outliers in key variables, we settled on an unbal-
anced sample of 395 firms with 7,065 patents and other
financial data for the 2001–2008 period. Although only 395
listed family firms remain, we argue that the sample does
not lose representativeness for the entire population of pub-
licly listed family firms, which are the focus of our study, for
the following six reasons. First, because it is a signatory to
TRIPs (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights),
India started product patenting in 2005 in many areas of
technology. Therefore, before 2005 we had far less, and less
complete, patent information that was mostly related to
process patenting (Chadha, 2009). Second, because of India’s
weak institutions, such as weak patent policy, many firms
have not patented their technology and innovation
(Deolalikar & Evenson, 1989). Third, patent applications
require large amounts of R&D investment and often require
a significant amount of time to progress from application to
granting patents. Therefore, we obtained patent information
only for those firms that can afford these processes. Fourth,
on the basis of the preceding explanation, we assume that
only firms that are able to bear the cost of patenting and are
well known in the financial market for their high R&D
activities are providing their patent information. In India,
these firms are publicly traded on the Bombay Stock
Exchange; publicly listed family firms, which are the focus of
this study, are the majority of these firms. Moreover, after
matching 10,000 patents retrieved for Indian firms with
CMIE ownership data, we obtained 7,065 patents. Therefore,
we obtained 70 percent of the patents and used this infor-
mation to construct the main dependent variable in our
model. From this perspective, our sample is largely repre-
sentative of publicly listed family firms. Fifth, there might be
a possibility to model firms without any patent information
by using Heckman correction and including an inverse
Mill’s ratio in the regression. We have tested that and found
no significant differences from our reported results. Finally,
our sample size is also consistent with other studies on
family ownership and business groups in emerging markets.
For example, Singh and Gaur (2009) used only 400 Indian
firms, whereas Peng and Jiang (2010) used 634 family firms
for seven emerging markets in their studies.
Variables
We considered the patent-R&D ratio as proxy for the depen-
dent variable, innovation productivity, because input
(research effort, such as R&D expenses) and output (patent
numbers or number of products) can be observed from avail-
able data, but the intention (inventions) of the inventor or
firm cannot. In addition, there is a linear homogeneous rela-
tionship between input for innovation, such as R&D expen-
diture, and output, such as patents or products (Coe &
Helpman, 1995). Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue that
R&D activities lead to invention, which eventually results
in product or process innovation. To capture this effect, we
followed the study of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and
measured innovation productivity by the number of patents
per unit of R&D spending. Consistent with the existing lit-
erature (Griliches, Pakes, & Hall, 1987) and following recent
studies, we also included the number of patents (Choi et al.,
2012) and R&D intensity (Chen & Hsu, 2009) as proxies for
innovation as dependent variables.
Following Khanna and Palepu (2000b) and Singh and
Gaur (2009), we considered the percentage of shares held by
the founding family as an individual or group to be a proxy
for family ownership concentration, which was an explana-
tory variable. In addition, our estimation consisted of a
dummy variable representing family firm, which was coded
as 1 if the minimum threshold of family ownership of 20
percent2 was met, and 0 otherwise. To understand the effect
of business groups (business house) we calculated three
interaction terms depending on whether the firm has family
ownership and falls into one of the three following main
categories (available from PROWESS): top 50 business
groups, large business group and others. The business
group is a dummy variable (1 if the firm is affiliated to any
business group, and 0 otherwise) based on business group
size and group activities.
A number of control variables were included. The prior
literature on family business shows that “family ties” (an
important intangible resource, according to the resource-
based perspective) and common interest alignment and
emotional attachment (hard-to-imitate asset) may reduce
agency costs between family members and their firms
(Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). When a family
member often holds the CEO position and/or serves on the
board of directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), the family ties to
the firm are strengthened. Recent studies on emerging
markets also show that family CEOs are generally politically
connected, which is of assistance in external funding and
political bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006). To
control for the effect of family members in management and
control (apart from cash flow rights), we included a dummy
variable set to 1 if a member of a founding family is in the
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CEO position and 0 otherwise. This measure is based on
hand-collected information from the annual reports and
websites of the firms. The size of the firm indicates the
present and future prospects for innovation (Craig & Dibrell,
2006). Momentary increases or decreases of sales provide a
signal of firms’ innovation activities. We used a logarithm of
sales as proxy for the size of the firms. The age of the firm is
also important. Many studies on innovation have used the
number of scientists, employees or age of the firm in this
respect. We adopted a logarithm of age to control for the
experience of the firm, following Cohen and Klepper (1996).
The resource dependence perspective suggests that firm-
level intangible resources influence innovation activities.
Knowledge stock, an important intangible resource, signifi-
cantly contributes to the distributed lag of current and past
innovation activities (Blundell et al., 1999) because innova-
tion depends largely on combinations of existing technologi-
cal knowledge. Thus, we used the last 4 years’ patent
numbers (calculated by the perpetual inventory method) to
control for the effect of innovative knowledge stock. The
corporate governance literature shows that foreign owner-
ship of a firm indicates a significant extent of knowledge
transfer from the international environment to that firm
(Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). Therefore, we controlled for the
shares of family firms owned by foreign corporate bodies
and institutions. Chang, Chung, and Mahmood (2006) show
that state-owned firms have significant access to important
infrastructure provided by the innovation policy of their
government. Therefore, we also controlled for the percent-
age of governmental shareholding. Family firms in business
groups can be a single and independent legal entity or con-
glomerates that operate in different sectors. Unlike conglom-
erates, family group firms often share structural features
across firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005) that affect innovation.
Therefore, we used firm-level data and not conglomerate-
level data. Because different industries have different tech-
nological and learning regimes that affect the innovation
capabilities of firms, we controlled for the industry effect by
constructing industry dummies that were equal to 1 if the firm
belonged to the manufacturing, information technology or
chemical industries and 0 otherwise. These industries were
chosen as they have the most number of patents in the
sample. SEBI implemented a new regulation in 2006 that
requires listed firms to disclose detailed information on cor-
porate governance and equity and share holdings. We, thus,
used two year-span dummies for the 2001–2005 period and
the 2006–2008 period. Table 1 provides definitions of vari-
ables and data sources.
From the innovation literature, it is widely accepted that
technological knowledge spillovers and factor demands are
substitutes for one another because this flow decreases labor




Innovation productivity Number of patents/R&D expenses
R&D intensity R&D expenditure/Sales
Family ownership (%) Percentage of all classes of shares held by the family (shareholding of Individuals
and Hindu Undivided Family) as an individual or as a group
Family firms Dummy indicates 1 if founding family holds minimum of 20% shares
Family CEO Dummy indicates 1 if founding family member(s) is CEO or in BoD
Family ownership (%)*
dummy 50 BG








Interaction term indicating the others business groups affiliated firms with family
ownership
Foreign ownership (%) Percentage of common shares owned by foreign individual, corporate bodies
State ownership (%) Percentage of common shares owned by State Government
Firm size Log of total sales
Firm age Log of firm’s age
Knowledge stock Number of patents in last 4 years assuming 15% annual depreciation and an 8%
growth backward in times
Wage intensity Wage/Sales
Employee compensation Last 5 years average employee compensation
Total assets (moving
average)
Last 5 years average total assets
Industry dummy 1 if the firm belongs to Manufacturing, IT or chemical industry, 0 otherwise
The industry dummy is created by using National Industry Classification (NIC) code available in Prowess database. Patent data are
obtained from PATSTAT. Ownership and Other information are obtained from Prowess.
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lower levels of management hierarchy exist, employee com-
pensation costs at the operational level are consequently
higher than in non-family firms. Werner, Tosi, and
Gomez-Mejia (2005) find that the compensation strategy is a
function of ownership structure. Therefore, we used the
average compensation and wage intensity (measured by wages
over sales) over the last 5 years as instruments. In addition,
we also included the last 5 years moving average assets of
the firm as another instrument. Along with these three
instruments, we instrumented the endogenous regressor,
i.e., family ownership in the system-GMM model, by a vari-
able business risk that was constructed from the standard
deviation of sales divided by total assets because family
firms affiliated with business groups generally diversify
business risks among group members.
Specification of Econometric Model
Because most empirical corporate governance studies show
both positive and negative effects of family ownership on
firm innovation, King and Santor (2008) recently argued that
this might be because of misspecifications of the model
(simultaneity) and incorrect model estimation because of
unobserved firm heterogeneity that biases the results. These
factors are recognized as a potential source of endogeneity.
To solve the endogeneity problem in this study, we aim to
improve the existing econometric model in empirical corpo-
rate governance literature by revising the basic knowledge
production (for innovation) model used in the innovation
literature. Specifically, to examine the relationship between
family ownership and innovation, we begin with the knowl-
edge production function developed by Griliches (1979) and
then modify it according to our research questions.
The knowledge production function we have undertaken
is generally used to examine the impact of investment on a
firm’s R&D and patent applications. Prior studies have esti-
mated a “static” model of the form: innovation = f(ownership
percentage, firm characteristics, fixed effects), that can be for-
mally written as:
Y Z V Sit it t t it= + + + +β β λ ε0 1 (1)
where Yit is the innovation productivity of firm i in time t
because of the input for innovation (e.g., percentage change
in share holdings) of the firm, assuming that the firm
maintains other input factors constant over the period of this
study. b1 captures the effect of the percentage of shares held
by owners of the firm and Zit is a vector of firm-specific
factors that determine the ownership structure that are
assumed to be associated with innovation activities (directly
or indirectly) and includes the treatment variables. V
indicates industry dummies, whereas St implies the
dummies for each time span (not exactly a time counter,
but a time counter of each period, e.g., 2001–2005 and
2006–2008). eit is the idiosyncratic error and is an
unobservable term of firm i in time t.
Analytical Techniques
Following the previous studies on family businesses (e.g.,
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), we began with traditional fixed-
and random-effect models. The panel nature of our data
allows us to control for any unobserved variables (e.g., insti-
tutional differences) that change over time but not across
family firms. We used fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. The effect of the time invariant covariates did
not appear in fixed-effect regression models (not reported)
because the effect is cancelled out by the within transforma-
tion. Therefore, it is difficult to identify whether family firms
hold more shares (i.e., more cash flow rights) as a result of
superior performance of the firm or because of the return on
their investment (including personal wealth) to the firm
because successful innovations may trigger more investment
in the firm. If simultaneity exists, the family ownership vari-
able would be biased upward. In the fixed-effects model, we
permitted the family ownership variables to be correlated
with random individual specific effects, which should mini-
mize the endogeneity. Thus, if the decision of family owner-
ship is correlated with certain unobserved variables, we can
assume that they are correlated with only time-invariant
components of the unobserved variable that are captured
by the individual family firm-specific effects. In other words,
the fixed-effects model might give us consistent estimates of
the marginal effect of regressor, provided the regressor is
time varying (even if it is endogenous). As an alternative,
following Gaur and Kumar (2009), we used random-effects
estimations of the level equation (1), and these are reported
in Table 4. The random-effects models provide more effi-
cient estimates than the fixed-effect models in the absence of
any correlation between time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity and the regressors. This model allows us to examine
the variations among cross-sectional units simultaneously
with variations among individual units over time. The
Hausman test shows the justification of using the random-
effect models.3
Addressing Endogeneity Issues
A large number of empirical studies on corporate gover-
nance recognize ownership structure as an endogenous
variable (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). We find that the coef-
ficient of family ownership is not robust to inclusion of fixed
effects (industry or firm). That is, family ownership and
innovation are determined by common factors, some of
which are unobservable to econometricians. Moreover, the
family owners of a firm would prefer to obtain all inputs for
innovation without any problem. For instance, Munari,
Oriani, and Sobrero (2010) show that managers are likely to
prefer a firm’s resources to low-risk R&D projects. In fact,
because the family owners might have insider information
about their firm, performance-based compensation would
influence the innovation outputs. Therefore, expected inno-
vation and technological progress can also shape the family
ownership structure, which leads to reverse causality. In the
current context, this endogeneity problem may also occur
because the current value of family ownership is a function
of the past innovation of the firm. Thus, the regression results
would be spurious if we do not carefully address these
endogeneity concerns.
We respond to the endogeneity problem by rewriting our
empirical model (1) as the following: innovation = f(past inno-
vation activities, ownership percentage, firm characteristics, fixed
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effects), which leads us to the following two broad goals of
this study: (1) to understand the “dynamic” relationship
between family ownership and innovation and (2) to esti-
mate this dynamic model in this context. These issues can be
addressed through several approaches by following prior
studies in similar situations. For example, Smith, Cin, and
Vodopivec (1997) control for simultaneity by analyzing the
data with two-stage Tobit least-squares methods, whereas
Mueller, Dietl, and Peev (2003) use a binary logit regression.
Generally, compared to the average investors families (or
promoters), have longer stakes in their firms, which allows
them exceptional foresight in predicting future firm perfor-
mance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Thus, family ownership is
potentially correlated with all error terms, time varying com-
ponents and firm-specific fixed effects. In recent years,
Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) have used an IV-GMM
technique to examine foreign ownership on total factor pro-
ductivity of Italian manufacturing firms. Becuase the instru-
ments help find the exogenous variables uncorrelated with
the dependent variable and strongly correlated with the
endogenous variables, the IV-GMM estimator solves the
moment conditions that impose orthogonality between
the error term and the set of instruments (including the
exogenous regressors).
In this study, we address endogeneity in two phases. In
the first phase, we adopt the two-stage least square (2SLS)
estimator (without including the past innovation activities of
firms) using the following three instruments: last 5 years
total assets, employee compensation, and wage intensity (see
Table 1 for definition). The regressions show us the positive
effects of family ownership on innovation productivity, as
opposed to the random-effects panel models reported in
Table 4. However, the results are not statistically significant;
nonetheless, it provides some indication that support the
instruments.
In the second phase, we apply a dynamic generalized
method of moment (GMM) estimator as proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991)4 to our panel to estimate the rela-
tionship between family ownership and innovation. Unlike
2SLS or random- (or fixed-) effects panel regression –
because current innovation activities are influenced by past
family ownership and associated innovation – it may be pos-
sible to use some combination of variables from a firm’s
history as a valid instrument in this dynamic GMM to
account for simultaneity (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).
Thus, the use of “internal” instruments contained within the
panel itself eliminates the search for external instruments.
Moreover, unlike ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, we
can include firm-fixed effects to account for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, we further improve our model following a
similar model by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The
model is presented below and the derivation is shown in the
appendix.




it k t it= + + + + + >−∑ ∑ξ α μ δ ε( ) , ,Z 0 (2)
In this model, we consider the lags in innovation and for
unobserved individual factors that are time-variant by
allowing mit = nmi(t-1) + eit to be the first-order autoregressive
process, |n| < 1.
In particular, the basic estimation has the following two
steps: we use a difference-GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond,
1998) that allows us to eliminate the potential endogeneity
because of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The
first differenced model (3) is estimated by GMM using the
lagged values of independent variables as instruments.




it it= + + + >−∑ ∑ξ α μ ε( ) , ,Z 0 (3)
However, Arellano and Bover (1995) note that that the
variables in levels may be weak instruments for first-
differenced models. Therefore, to overcome this problem,
we include the equations in levels in the estimation methods.
In other words, the first-differenced variables are used as
instruments for equations in levels in a system of equations
that includes the equations in both levels and differences
(Wintoki et al., 2012). This method is called system-GMM
estimation.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The collinearity test indicates that none of the variables has a
variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 5, which rules out
multicollinearity. Tables 2 and 3 represent the correlation
matrix and the summary statistics, respectively, of the con-
tinuous variables of interests. From the correlation matrix,
we see that family ownership is positively correlated with
innovation productivity. Moreover, family ownership is
negatively associated with size (total sales) and age of the
firm. This suggests that older firms invest more in invention
activities.
The summary statistics from 395 listed firms show that 278
firms are family owned and 197 firms are affiliated with
business groups. Families in family firms hold a maximum
of 80 percent of shares, whereas the group-affiliated family
firms hold a maximum of 72 percent of equity shares. Obvi-
ously, firms holding more than 72 percent are stand-alone
firms. In terms of innovation activities, the mean of innova-
tion productivity and R&D intensity are higher for the
stand-alone firms compared to business groups. Notably,
family firms are younger than non-family firms, whereas
total sales and total assets are lower in family firms than in
non-family firms. We have also performed a t-test of the
difference of means and the findings show that most of the
variables are statistically significant.
Table 4 shows the general linear square (GLS) random-
effects model estimation of equation (1), in which the results
are documented separately for the group firms and stand-
alone firms. The coefficients of overall family ownership
(including both group-affiliated and stand-alone firms) are
negative for both the number of patents and innovation pro-
ductivity. This is consistent with results from the previous
studies on emerging markets (Chen & Hsu, 2009) and on
developed economies (Munoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno,
2011), which find a significant and negative relationship
between family ownership and innovation. Although the
model may explain large variations in the data, which are
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indicated by high R2, the estimates might be heavily biased
because of unobserved heterogeneity (becuase Zit and eit are
correlated). Suppose the idiosyncratic error varies over indi-
viduals and time, such that eit = vi + uit, where vi is the found-
ing family specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity,
e.g., unobserved family culture that remains constant over
time. However, the estimates continue to violate the
assumption of random-effects estimators that Zit is uncorre-
lated with both vi and uit.
The firm’s dominant shareholders, in general, give impor-
tance to human capital to shape managerial decisions to
allocate resources efficiently, particularly during an eco-
nomic crisis. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) give importance to
the wage differentials between domestic- and foreign-
owned firms. Thus, we used three instruments – the last 5
years average of total assets of the firm, the last 5 years
average of employee compensation and the wage intensity
(as computed by executives and employees salaries,
bonuses, and other benefits over total sales of the firm) –
for the family ownership. Table 5 reports the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression. For the
relevance of the instruments used, we report the first
stage regression summary in Table 5, which shows that at
least one instrument is significant at the .1 percent level.
The validity of the instruments was also checked with the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis, the
endogeneity should not affect the OLS estimator (not
reported), which indicates bOLS is consistent and efficient,
whereas bIV is consistent but inefficient. However, model 3
of Table 5 shows the rejection of family ownership exogene-
ity. We employed three instruments for the family owner-
ship variable. If at least one instrument is valid, then it is
necessary to test whether other instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term in the second stage. From the test
reported in Table 5, we could not reject the over-identifying
restriction. Instead, we expect either all or no instruments to
be valid. In Table 5 (models 2 and 4), we also report the
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator
to rule out the presence of weak instruments. Although the
2SLS regression indicates that no family ownership variable
is significantly associated with firm innovation, it supports
the argument that family ownership and family CEO are
endogenously determined. Moreover, we have a good indi-
cation that there is a positive impact of family ownership
concentration on innovation productivity.
From equation (1), one may argue that the causality may
run in both directions, e.g., higher productivity may offer an
incentive to family owners to invest more in R&D or with
the help of more investment in innovation activities, produc-
tivity may be increased. Thus, the regressors are correlated
with the error terms. In this case, the fixed-effects instru-
mental variable regression might be effective. However, the
first stage statistics of the regression (results in Table 5) show
that the instruments are weak and consequently a biased
estimator is obtained. Therefore, in the presence of the non-
iid (independent and identically distributed) errors, we used
system-GMM5 for equation (2) as developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM
estimators, reported in Table 6, give consistent and efficient
estimates because the moment conditions use an optimal
weighting matrix that maximizes its asymptotic variance
(see Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003). Moreover, with addi-
tional instruments for the equation in levels, system-GMM is
more efficient than difference-GMM. We further controlled
for unobserved heterogeneity between large and small firms
by allowing an autoregressive component in the error term.
In Table 6, we included three proxies for innovation,
namely number of patents, R&D intensity and innovation
productivity. We found that family ownership concentration
is positively associated with innovation outcome of the
sample firms (e.g., model 5: b = .01, p < .05 and model 6:
b = .03, p < .001). However, the coefficient of family owner-
ship is negatively correlated with the number of patents, as
shown in models 1 and 2 (model 1: b = -.27, p < .05 and
model 2: b = -.22, p < .001). We thus further analyzed the
interaction effects of family ownership concentration and a
dummy denoting the subset of family ownership with a
threshold value of 20 percent shareholding and find that the
role of family ownership is consistent with the existing lit-
erature (Faccio & Lang, 2002). The result of model 6 in
Table 6 provides support for hypothesis 1 by indicating that
family ownership concentration positively affects the inno-
vation productivity of publicly listed family firms at the .1
percent significance level (model 6: b = .17, p < .001), which
TABLE 2
Correlation Matrix
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Innovation productivity (1) 1.00
Family ownership (%) (2) .12* 1.00
Foreign ownership (%) (3) .03* -.01* 1.00
Knowledge stock (4) .04*** .02* -.02* 1.00
Total sales (5) -.03 -.05 -.02 -.05 1.00
Firm age (6) -.07** -.13*** .01 .08 .10*** 1.00
Total assets (7) -.04 -.05* -.03 -.04 .83*** .11*** 1.00
Employee compensation (8) -.04 -.04 -.02 -.07 .42*** .10*** .55*** 1.00
The numbers listed horizontally across the top row correspond to the number and variables listed vertically on the table.
***, ** and * represent a .1%, 1% and 5% significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.
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is consistent with the literature discussed in the hypothesis
development section. With respect to the institutional per-
spectives that focus on the origin of business groups because
of the weak institutional framework in India, we examined
the role of business group affiliation of these family firms.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that business groups have a positive
influence on family firms promoting innovation. Our find-
ings show that the family firms affiliated with only the top 50
business groups play a positive and significant role in inno-
vation productivity, as reported in model 7. Thus, all other
things being equal, this result is consistent with our predic-
tion in hypothesis 2 (model 6: b = .16, p < .01). In model 10
we tested our hypotheses in a full model by including all the
independent variables. We found that there was an
improved effect of family ownership and affiliation with
business group on innovation. The p-value of the first- and
second-order autocorrelation tests (z1 and z2) indicates no
second order serial correlation and the Sargan test confirms
that all the instruments (average assets for the last 5 years;
average employee compensation for the last 5 years, and the
lagged value of all the regressors) support the analysis.
Several results of the control variables are notable. Models
6–10 show that the variable family CEO negatively impacts
innovation productivity. This result supports the agency
theory that too dominant family control (or possible CEO
duality) has a negative influence on innovation activities of
firms and is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chen &
Hsu, 2009). We reported these results in models 6–9 (e.g.,
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics
(A) Number of firms Family firms Non-family firms T-Test
278 117
Mean SD Max Mean SD Max Diff
Innovation productivity .62 2.74 41.18 .59 3.75 60.00 .03*
R&D intensity .10 3.12 125.60 .01 .02 .19 .09
Number of patents 3.04 9.92 113.00 2.75 20.10 282.00 .29*
Family ownership (%) 5.69 14.16 80.18 .45 2.13 19.17 5.24***
Indian corp. promoters (%) 4.90 14.23 78.58 3.53 11.71 73.70 1.37***
Foreign corp. promoters (%) .92 5.81 90.00 2.67 11.61 76.00 -1.75**
Knowledge stock 287.25 314.44 1,645.48 387.68 999.49 4,509.43 -100.40**
Firm size 1,181.57 6,266.81 139,269.46 4,495.78 20,315.20 270,582.36 -3,314.20
Total assets 1,404.74 6,982.89 150,149.41 3,670.76 13,466.44 136,872.50 -2,266.00**
Firm age (years) 32.71 20.28 108.00 43.77 20.00 90.00 -11.06**
Employee compensation 106.59 549.56 9,553.51 231.62 711.03 8,069.15 -125.00**
(B) Number of firms Group firms Stand-alone firms T-Test
197 198
Mean SD Max Mean SD Max Diff
Innovation productivity .60 3.45 60.00 .63 2.72 41.18 -.03*
R&D intensity .02 .08 1.21 .12 3.63 125.60 -.10*
Number of patents 4.34 18.89 282.00 1.56 5.79 69.00 2.79**
Family ownership (%) 2.45 9.35 72.02 4.19 12.15 80.18 -1.73**
Indian corp. promoters (%) 7.40 16.24 78.58 1.55 6.44 66.32 5.85***
Foreign corp. promoters (%) 1.16 6.42 51.59 2.47 11.48 90.00 -1.31**
Knowledge stock 390.42 708.99 4,509.43 181.01 187.8 821.96 209.40***
Total sales 1,699.18 7,299.98 139,269.46 2,795.06 16,410.78 270,582.36 -1,095.90*
Total assets 1,898.09 8,022.15 150,149.41 2,368.95 10,976.94 136,872.50 -470.90**
Firm age (years) 39.58 22.08 108.00 33.01 18.97 90.00 6.57***
Employee compensation 140.84 578.88 9,553.51 152.79 637.58 8,069.15 -11.95**
Total number of firms 395. Family firms refer to those where the found families hold more than 20% of shares or the founding family
members are in CEO position. Group firms are firms affiliated to business groups.
T-test for statistically significant difference in means of two samples.
***, ** and * represent a .1%, 1% and 5% significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.
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model 6: b = -.35, p < .001). Firm size shows a negative and
significant impact on innovation productivity. This might
imply that strong reliance of family trust decreases as the
firm grows and this further decreases the effects of family
control on innovation. Although small firms may have diffi-
culty in securing adequate collateral to obtain external
financing for innovation, affiliating with business groups
provides them with the ability to access internal capital
markets. Thus, consistent with the literature on developed
countries (Acs & Audretsch, 1988), small and medium size
enterprises (SMEs) are more innovative than large firms in
emerging markets. Moreover, these SMEs are much faster to
react to the changing and emerging technological market
niches than large firms. However, in our study, family firms
are not necessarily SMEs. Thus, it is possible that as a family
business grows, it becomes more diversified, which may
affect its innovation activities.
Robustness Checks
In the robustness tests, we report the coefficients estimated
with different specifications of the variables in Table 7. We
checked 10 percent and 30 percent threshold values of stake-
holdings by the founding family of the firms. In both cases,
we found a positive impact of family ownership on innova-
tion (model 1: b = .02, p < .001 and model 2: b = .08, p < .05).
In our data, we found that approximately 40 percent of total
firms belong to the manufacturing industry. Thus, we con-
TABLE 4
Effect of Family Ownership on Innovation Productivity
Dependent variables Number of patents Innovation productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(A) Group firms




.56 (.64) .08 (.07)
Family CEO -1.17 (4.19) -1.21 (4.19) .19 (.81) .20 (.81)
Firm size 1.66 (1.35) 1.69 (1.35) 1.56 (1.36) -.46* (.25) -.42* (.26) -.51* (.26)
Firm age -.93 (2.85) -1.29 (3.14) -1.35 (3.14) .30 (.52) .48 (.58) .38 (.58)
Knowledge stock .07*** (.09) .05*** (.07) .05*** (.02) .10 (.12) .11 (.08) .09 (.21)
Foreign ownership (%) -.26 (.25) -.25 (.25) -.20 (.26) .09 (.03) .09 (.03) .10 (.03)
Constant -16.76 (12.94) -15.08 (14.32) -11.74 (14.75) 3.97 (2.15) 3.74 (2.38) 4.00 (2.42)
Observation 178 178 178 164 164 164
R-Squared .73 .74 .74 .14 .11 .14
Wald c2 475.24*** 472.66*** 473.26*** 33.96*** 34.88*** 31.24***
(B) Standalone firms




-.15 (.22) -.06 (.11)
Family CEO 8.27* (4.13) 8.41 (4.43) -2.35 (1.72) -2.34 (1.72)
Firm size 1.29* (.65) 1.80** (.69) 1.80* (.73) -1.21** (.35) -1.27** (.41) -1.23** (.40)
Firm age -12.31** (4.14) -11.27** (4.13) -11.20* (4.45) 2.13 (1.62) 2.15 (1.73) 2.24 (1.75)
Knowledge stock .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) .03 (.00) .01 (.00)
Foreign ownership (%) .20* (.10) .27** (.10) .28** (.11) -.14 (.04) -.11 (.04) -.07 (.04)
Constant 6.96** (13.13) 5.98 (14.17) 4.90 (15.45) .15 (5.64) .56 (6.36) .08 (6.57)
Observations 62.00 62.00 62.00 58.00 58.00 58.00
R-Squared 46.51 51.39 48.87 31.19 32.65 33.19
Wald c2 29.25*** 34.81*** 34.27*** 22.73** 24.37** 23.95**
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 395 firms that filed 7,065 patents in different patent offices around the world during 2001–2008. The
observation used is 2,396.
All models are estimated by GLS random-effect regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Family ownership (%) variable is measured as the percentage shares held by Indian individual and Hindu undivided families (as
individual or group). In all models Industry and year effect are included but not shown.
***, ** and * represent a .1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.
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trolled for this particular industry to ascertain whether our
results were driven by it. The results (models 1 and 2) are
consistent with the previous findings. As discussed in the
theoretical framework, financial and accounting data,
including ownership structure, become more precise after
the amendment of the disclosure rule in 2005–2006. To
capture this effect, we included two dummy variables that
indicated the two periods, i.e., 2001–2005 and 2006–2008. In
model 4, we found that the effect of family ownership on
innovation productivity with a minimum of 20 percent
stakeholdings substantially increased after 2006 (model 4:
b = .31, p < .01). The results for non-family firms (in which
family owners hold less than 20 percent of equity) are also
reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 7.
For emerging and transitional economies, foreign partners
often provide domestic firms with advanced technology,
management skills and other resources beyond financial
support (Choi et al., 2011). Studies on Chinese firms show
that an increase in foreign ownership is positively related
with successful industrial growth (Peng, 2000). In India, with
a large proportion of family firms, the government allows the
entry of foreign MNCs to access advanced foreign technol-
ogy. Foreign ownership also acts as a crucial driver for reform
in corporate governance and institutional framework devel-
opment in emerging markets (Choi et al., 2011). Moreover, in
emerging markets, governments facilitate technology
absorption among local firms through various support poli-
cies (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). Chang et al. (2006) show that
state-owned firms have significant access to important infra-
structure provided by governmental innovation policy,
although the nature of government’s choices is driven by both
social and political goals. Therefore, in emerging markets,
state ownership can provide greater protection to sharehold-
ers when legal protection for minority shareholders is weak
(Sun, Tong, & Tong 2002). Thus, the government acts as a
mediator to minimize the agency problem when it is linked
with firms through equity holding. This is the case in India
where the majority of family ownership takes advantage of
both foreign partners and the government. We found that
foreign and state ownership are both positively associated
with innovation output in family firms.
Although we attempt to investigate the effects of family
ownership on innovation (measured by patents-to-R&D
expenses ratio), it is also notable to test the effects of those
family firms without active patent information. Thus, there
might be a possibility in modeling firms without any patent
information by using a Heckman correction and including
an inverse Mill’s ratio in the regression. We performed that
TABLE 5
Effect of Family Ownership on Innovation
Dependent variables Number of patents Innovation productivity
2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family ownership (%) 2.72 (2.66) 3.80 (3.85) 2.58 (7.66) .33 (.22)
Family CEO -.49 (5.03) -.72 (5.24) -.80 (2.07) -.41 (.43)
Family ownership (%)*Family firms -2.28 (2.46) -3.30 (3.58) -2.43 (7.18) -.32 (.20)
Firm size 3.02* (1.27) 3.12* (1.40) -.13 (1.06) -.38* (.18)
Firm age -.07 (3.82) -.16 (4.23) .81 (2.39) .14 (.27)
Knowledge stock .05*** (.01) .05*** (.01) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
Foreign ownership (%) -.31 (.38) -.40 (.48) -.37 (1.06) -.06 (.04)
Constant -45.84 (27.80) -48.67 (31.82) -6.90 (33.53) 2.73 (2.23)
Observations 161 161 148 148
Durbin-Wu-Hausman
c2 (1) 32.67 (p = .10) 25.499 (p = .01)
F 12.28 (p = .13) 14.175 (p = .04)
Over identifying restriction
c2 (2) 3.79 (p = .15) 5.392 (p = .26)
First stage regression
Adjusted R-squared .97 .96 .96 .97
F (P) 12.25 (.00) 10.25 (.04) 12.31 (.01) 9.31 (.00)
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 197 firms affiliated to business groups during 2001–2008.
All models are estimated by 2SLS and LIML regressions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscadasticity are shown in paren-
theses. Family ownership (%) variable is measured as the percentage shares held by Indian individual and Hindu undivided families (as
individual or group). In all models Industry and year effect are included but not shown.
The instruments applied for the equation are last 5 years average total assets, last 5 years average employee compensation and wage
intensity (wage/total sales). Only firms affiliated to Business groups have been considered here.
***, ** and * represent a .1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.
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exercise and found no significant differences from our
reported results (Table 6). In summary, our results are
robust.
CONCLUSION
Main Findings and Implications
Existing studies highlight the need to investigate ownership
structures and innovation in the context of institutional pres-
sures to address the limitations of agency theory (Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013). Our study provided empiri-
cal support for this relationship from emerging markets,
such as India, in which the institutional framework is not
well developed. We made three important contributions to
the literature on family ownership and innovation. First, we
examined the direct effect of family ownership on innova-
tion of Indian listed family firms and showed that the
institutional and external-resourcing perspectives might
complement agency theory in a better way in this context.
Second, we offered insights about how a business group
affiliation of family firms influences the relationship
TABLE 7
Robustness Checks
Dependent variable Innovation productivity
Business groups Stand-alone
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Innovation productivity (t-1) .37*** (.01) .37*** (.01) .41*** (.03) .37*** (.02) .29* (.32) .49** (.13)












.29** (.15) .31** (.13) -1.04 (1.04) -1.56 (1.02)
Family CEO -.14** (.04) -.04 (.04) -.04* (.04) -.01** (.04) .51 (1.27) .44 (.57)
Firm size -.18*** (.01) -.21*** (.02) -.17*** (.02) -.22*** (.02) -.54 (.31) -.39* (.19)
Firm age -.22*** (.03) -.28*** (.04) -.17*** (.03) -.25*** (.04) 2.20 (1.55) 2.45 (1.17)
Knowledge stock -.00 (.00) .00*** (.00) .00 (.00) .00** (.00) .00 (.00) .00** (.00)
State ownership (%) 2.57*** (.15) 3.27*** (.27) 2.42*** (.39) 3.38*** (.32) .01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Foreign ownership (%) .01*** (.00) .01*** (.00) .01*** (.00) .01*** (.00) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Manufacturing inds. -1.53 (1.15) -1.64 (1.42) -1.16 (1.27) -2.18 (1.22)
Year 2001–05 dummy .23*** (.04) 1.37** (.37)
Year 2006–08 dummy .09*** (.02) .07 (.27)
Constant 3.82** (1.12) 4.22** (1.39) 2.91* (1.27) 4.74*** (1.20) -3.74 (3.63) -5.28 (3.27)
Observation 135 135 135 135 54 54
Sargan 127.00 119.99 118.72 130.09 125.78 132.44
Df 26 26 25 25 30 21
p-sargan .03 .01 .04 .02 .02 .00
z1 .00 .05 .00 .04 .06 .03
z2 .62 .37 .44 .29 1.00 .96
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 197 group firms and 198 stand-alone firms in 2001–2008.
All columns are estimated by system-GMM estimator. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskadasticity are shown in italics. The
instruments applied for the equation are as Table 5. z1 and z2 shows the p-values of tests for first and second order serial correlation in the
differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond tests for AR(1) and AR(2)) that are distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.
The Sargan tests for over-identifying restrictions, computed as two-step estimates, is asymptotically distributed as a c2 under the null of
instrument validity. Degrees of freedom and p-values are also reported. In all the models, year and industry dummies are included, if not
specified.
***, ** and * represent a .1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.
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between family ownership and innovation in India. Third,
we adopted a more rigorous econometrics method by pro-
viding a panel analysis using a system-GMM estimator and
addressed endogeneity thoroughly, which therefore signifi-
cantly improved the shortcomings of methodologies used in
the previous literature.
Using an unbalanced panel of 395 BSE-listed Indian firms
during 2001–2008, we found that, after controlling for pos-
sible endogeneity, the impact of family ownership on inno-
vation productivity is positive. We further emphasized the
business group affiliation of family firms and distinguished
between innovation activities of group-affiliated and stand-
alone family firms. We found that affiliation with the top 50
business groups increased the innovation activities of these
family firms.
Our results provide positive empirical support for the
theoretical argument that Indian firms with majority family
ownership may perform well with respect to innovation
(Mueller & Philippon, 2011). The positive association
between family ownership and innovation further supports
the findings of Sraer and Thesmar (2007) that family-owned
firms are less sensitive to industry shocks. Furthermore,
using the period dummy for 2006–2008, we provided empiri-
cal evidence that after the disclosure rule reform in 2005–
2006, the positive impact of family ownership on innovation
(shown in robustness checks) is stronger than in the previous
period (2001–2005). This indicates that when more family
firms become publicly listed and new disclosure rules are
implemented, their true potential for innovation and financial
performance might be better revealed. Therefore, our find-
ings suggest that the Indian government should improve
policies on information disclosure and establish more proper
corporate governance mechanisms for family businesses.
Our study also provides empirical evidence for the argu-
ment of CEO duality. Wong, Chang, and Chen (2010) and
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find in developed markets that, if
any member of the founder family serves as CEO or controls
the majority of board seats, the stock of the firms reacts
negatively in the stock market. Our study shows that family
CEOs reduce innovation activities in India and thus provides
evidence against CEO duality from an emerging market per-
spective. This also supports the evidence for tunneling in
India (Bertrand et al., 2002) because strong family control
may motivate the family to expropriate investments for
R&D. However, the reason for this negative relationship
may not be caused by the agency perspective as it is under-
stood in developed economies, but from institutional and
cultural perspectives. Generally, in India, it has been difficult
for traditional family businesses to hire professional manag-
ers for top positions in their firms because of the lack of an
effective labor market that can mobilize human resources.
Further, the Indian business culture has been described as,
“autocratic, sycophantic, emphasizing personal loyalties
rather than professionals” (Manikutty, 2000:289). This is par-
ticularly true in emerging economies. Because CEO duality
may have a negative impact on innovation, policymakers
should consider improving the corporate governance code
and further encourage family firms to have an independent
and professional CEO.
Our findings also indicate that innovation is impacted by
ownership structure and by the lack of supporting institu-
tional frameworks in emerging markets with concentrated
family ownership such as India. Thus, policymakers must
investigate the impact of institutional underdevelopment on
innovation before reforming ownership structure. More-
over, family firms typically have good relationships with the
major pillars of the local economy. Our findings may help
policymakers to promote an alliance between family firms
with research organizations, such as universities, to utilize
fundamental scientific knowledge to enhance innovation
capabilities in emerging markets.
Limitations
Although this paper tries to minimize the identification
problem by employing certain key instruments in appropri-
ate econometric models, it cannot fully overcome the causal
effect of family firms on innovation activities. However, as
Ornaghi (2009) argues, econometricians cannot always see
the correct information to eliminate the endogeneity
problem. Our study is no exception. First, there might be
omitted variable bias that was difficult to address because of
information availability, such as (1) political favors taken by
founding families do not appear in the balance sheet but this
might affect the performance of family firms, and (2) low
innovation performance might be the result of tunneling of
capital out of the firm in a business group run by controlling
families. Moreover, our results did not take into account the
recent economic crisis.
Second, with a sample of Russian (one of the BRIC coun-
tries) firms, Judge, Naoumova, and Koutzevol (2003) noted
that firm performance decreases when the board of directors
is controlled by the CEO of the firm. The study of Villalonga
and Amit (2006) also argues that the role of ownership can
be examined clearly with information about both ownership
and control. Although the enactment of Clause 49 (similar to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US) of Listing Agreements
clarifies the composition of the board of directors, we had
only limited information of CEO and board structure
throughout the survey period in this study. This may bias
our findings towards negative association of descendant
CEO and innovation.
Third, Indian family firms bring products and technolo-
gies to the market so frequently that they do not bother to
apply for patents. Therefore, the history of past innovation
activities is difficult to obtain to address endogeneity prop-
erly and specifically for the study of innovation in emerging
markets. Moreover, it may also bias the measurement of
innovation productivity if we only consider patented inven-
tions because not all inventions are patented or novel
enough to be eligible to be patented.
Concluding Remarks
Despite several limitations, our study has provided impor-
tant insights into family firms in emerging markets in which
the de facto institutional quality might better explain appar-
ent contradictions about the role of family ownership in
innovation. We show that using family owners to promote
innovation in emerging markets such as India is worth rec-
ommending. Family firms, particularly when they are affili-
ated with business groups, can establish strong research
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partnerships with universities, research organizations and
other industrial partners in emerging markets. Moreover,
they can contribute to regional innovation systems (see
Cooke, Gomez Uranga & Etxebarria, 1997) which are con-
ceptualized as an important hub of the innovation network
that utilize dynamic relations and interactions with local
firms. For instance, Bangalore in India has become the most
important IT cluster outside of the OECD countries (Arora &
Gambardella, 2004). One of the family firms in the Bangalore
IT cluster is Infosys Limited, which successfully provides
business consulting, technology and engineering outsourc-
ing services in more than 30 countries. However, the lack of
any significant positive association of families with the
number of patents in our findings can be alarming for the
economy. At first glance, it shows that family firms are gen-
erally reluctant to spend money and effort in applying for
patents. However, when we further analyze the patent-to-
R&D ratio and include it in a dynamic model, we find that
family firms care about the transformation of their R&D
effort into innovation output. The economic implication is
that, even if the family firms engage in less external R&D
investment than non-family firms, a proper collaboration
and network of R&D can maximize successful innovation
output with limited innovation input, which will lead to
better innovation productivity for family firms. It shows that
fewer registrations of the number of patents cannot simply
be interpreted as lower-quality innovation productivity.
Finally, the Indian financial markets have shown impres-
sive growth in recent years as the government has commit-
ted to advancing corporate governance reforms, including
SEBI’s initiative for transparency and good practice in cor-
porate governance. The improvement of the corporate gov-
ernance landscape in India, along with economic reforms
and technological innovations, has helped Indian industry to
sustain financial gains and growth. In addition, the transpar-
ency and reform in corporate governance in India may
attract other equity investors to choose opportunity and
potential investments with increased protection against
expropriation. Thus, the recent corporate governance mea-
sures taken by the Indian government seem to fill existing
institutional underdevelopment to attract capital from a
variety of external sources. This, indeed, may affect a large
number of family firms in India.6 In addition, Indian family
firms may have a strong symbiotic relationship with the
elected government and benefit from government protection
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). However, the continued presence
of a large number of family firms implies a lack of trust
in governmental action. In the post-liberalization period,
growing competitive pressures from foreign firms and also
imports have stimulated the innovation activities of Indian
SMEs, which are also family owned. These SMEs are often
provided with funds for technology development, modern-
ization, and technical know-how for innovation activities by
the government.
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NOTES
1. A comprehensive database that contains data on firms’ accounts,
backgrounds, corporate governance, and share prices since 1990
for a large number of companies. The database includes all firms
traded on India’s major stock exchanges (and several other
smaller exchanges), including public sector enterprises. The
database has been used in several papers on Indian firms, such
as Khanna and Palepu (2000b), Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), and
Bertrand et al. (2002).
2. Some studies establish a minimum control threshold such as 5,
10, or 20 percent for family-owned firms (Faccio & Lang, 2002; La
Porta et al., 1999).
3. The conventional Hausman test assumes the asymptotic normal-
ity of both fixed- and random-effect estimators, which may not
be true in all situations. We also tried to ascertain the significant
differences between these two estimators by a bootstrap
Hausman test. Using the fixed-effect estimators did not support
our findings.
4. Although Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) argue that first-differences are possibly weakly correlated
with their lagged levels for production function estimation
regressors because many economic variables evolve in a random
walk fashion at the micro level. Thus, the GMM estimator may
not give consistent results.
5. We have also used the difference GMM as the literature in
similar contexts recommends; the suggestion may be made
because the lagged levels of the regressors act as weak instru-
ments for the first differenced regressors. Alternatively, “system-
GMM”, an augmented version of “difference GMM”, was used
to help obtain efficient estimates for equation (2).
6. We thank one of the reviewers for noting this.
APPENDIX
We consider that the firm follows the condition given below
for its long-term innovation activities in the market
Y Y Y Y uit i t it i t it− = −( ) +− −( ) ( )1 1ρ τ (A1)
where Yi(t-1) is the productivity in (t-1) and Yitτ is the target
productivity of the firm in terms of both increased
investments in R&D and number of patents, assuming that
the firm employs maximum investments of its shareholders
in the innovation activities. r determines the speed of
productivity adjustment coefficient and 0  r  1.
The following situations may happen: If r < 1, the firm has
excess inventions for patenting at time t and it does not want
to increase its productivity in the near future, while r = 0
indicates that the firm believes that its present productivity
can place it in a better marketplace in the future, i.e., Y Yit itτ = .
However, r = 1 means that the firm has a plan to increase its
productivity because its present R&D activity is not enough
to achieve the competitive advantage in the future.
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This leads us to an optimal level of firm production that
can be represented by the following equation:
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(A2)
where jit is the vector of the firm’s unobservable individual
characteristics, Dk is the industry dummies for k industry. St
indicates the year spell dummies and Jit is the iid error term.
Plugging equation (A2) into equation (A1), we obtain
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Rearranging we get
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For unobserved individual factors that are time-variant, e.g.,
the technological knowledge of the scientists in R&D, we
allowed mit = nmi(t-1) + eit, to be first order autoregressive,
|n| < 1.
After simplifying and allowing Yit variable for p years of
lag,
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